

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN POST COLD WAR EAST-WEST RELATIONS

by

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Abstract

It has been over two decades since the end of the Cold War. A war that was defined by an ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. Today ideological conflict has receded but does not imply a death of ideologies. This paper looks at the role of ideology in East-West relations in a post-Cold War era. The paper uses secondary data to describe how Islamic fundamentalism has influenced Russia, China and the US and also how ideology affects Russia-US and US-China relations. The paper concludes that after the end of the cold war, ideology does not define East-West relations. Liberalism has emerged as the dominant ideology, however other secondary ideologies like Islamic fundamentalism, conservatism and nationalism play a role in East-West relations but is secondary to national interest.

Keywords: *Cold War, Capitalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Ideology, Pragmatic Socialism*

Introduction

In over two decades of the end of the Cold War and the world has yet to witness another ideological conflict of its kind. The cold war was a sustained state of political and military tension between powers in the Western bloc and powers in the Eastern bloc. The Western bloc included the United States of America with the allies and military alliance (NATO). The Eastern bloc included the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) with its allies and the Warsaw pact. It was a war that involved nuclear deterrence, a struggle for dominance expressed through proxy wars, psychological warfare, propaganda, espionage and technological competition. A number of reasons have been proposed to be the cause of the cold war. They include America's fear of a communist attack; Truman's dislike of Stalin; USSR's fear of the American atomic bomb; USSR's dislike for capitalism; USSR's action in the Soviet zone of Germany; America's refusal to share nuclear secrets; USSR's fear of an American attack; USSR's need for a secure western border; USSR's aim of spreading world communism (Truman, 2015). However, most scholars agree that ideology played a major role in the cold war (Udoka, 2012; Leffler, 2005; Subrahmanyam, 2010; Painter & Leffler, 2005).

The Cold War was a war opposing ideologies. It was a war of two different ways of political and economic life. It was a war between capitalism and communism. Capitalism is an ideology that promotes a free market economy and liberal democracy. It is an ideology that posits that the economy should be guided by market forces of demand and supply. It is an ideology that boasts of the freedom of man and the protection of civil rights and liberties. Communism on the other hand is the brain child of Karl Marx. Its key elements are a state controlled economy, lack of private property and proletarian control of government. Communism is guided by the philosophy of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his need". (Marx, 1875).

Not all political thinkers have accepted that ideas and ideologies are of much importance. Politics has sometimes been thought to be little more than a naked struggle for power. If this is true, political ideas are mere propaganda, a form of words or slogans designed to win votes or attract popular support. Ideas and ideologies are therefore simply 'window dressing', used to conceal the

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deeper realities of political life. This is certainly a position supported by behaviorism, the school of psychology associated with John B. Watson (1878-1958) and B.F. Skinner (1904-1990).

The opposite argument has also been put. John Maynard Keynes, for example, argued that the world is ruled by little other than the ideas of economists and political philosophers. Ashe put it in the closing of his *General Theory*:

Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. (Keynes, 1936 cited in Heywood, 2017).

Quite simply, political theory and political practice are inseparably linked. Any balance and persuasive account of political life must therefore acknowledge the constant interplay between ideas and ideologies on the one hand, the historical and material forces on the other. Ideas and ideologies influence political life in a number of ways. In the first place, they provide a perspective through which the world is understood and explained. Secondly political ideas also help to shape the nature of political systems. Finally political ideas and ideologies can act as a form of social cement, providing social group and indeed hold societies, with a set of unifying beliefs and values. (Heywood, 2017).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, it seems the role of ideology in east-west relations has been declining. Communism as an ideology has receded and in some countries is been modified to include elements of liberalism (like limited private enterprises in China) Capitalism is the victor while Communism is a vanquished ideology hanging on to shreds of its past glory in states like Laos Kuba, Vietnam, China and North Korea. Although, there is no strong ideological context anymore, ideologies like conservatism, liberalism, ecologism and religious fundamentalism still influence East-West relations. It is in the light of the above reality that this paper used secondary data to explain the roles of ideology in East-West relations in a post cold-war era. The paper looks at the role of ideology as an element of state behaviour, the impact of religious fundamentalism on East and Western states' behavior is discussed. While the role of ideology in US-Russia relations and US-China relations is discussed. Before delving into the main discourse, the next section looks at the theoretical framework of this paper.

Fukuyama's End of History Thesis

Francis Fukuyama is an American political philosopher known for his post-cold war prediction contained in a 1989 article titled *The End of History* and a 1992 book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. He wrote the article in 1989 in an atmosphere where socialism was collapsing in the East. The article declared that liberal democracy was victorious and that liberal democracy marks an end point in the evolution of ideologies. It is the final form of human government and thus constitutes an end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). The subsequent book published in 1992 was a response to critics and a defense of his original thesis.

The 'End of History' is not an original concept but can be traced to Hegel. According to Hegel, history is a dialectical process, with a beginning, a middle and an end. Fukuyama also made reference to Marx. Marx believes that the direction of historical development was a purposeful one and would come to an end with the achievement of communist utopia that will finally resolve all prior contradictions. On the contrary, Fukuyama opined that the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal, democratic, recognizes and protects man's universal right of freedom through a system of laws. (Fukuyama, 1992). Fukuyama explains that the end of history will come with the end of main contradictions of human history. He states the evolution process of human history as follows: human history was based on the existence of contradiction between master and slaves. But in the universal homogenous state, all prior contradictions are

resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no large conflict, what remains is primarily economic activities. The universal homogenous state is a product of the end of ideological development. (Fukuyama, 1992).

Fukuyama also pointed out that following the end of ideological warfare, religion and nationalism may cause new challenges. Modern liberalism was a consequence of the weakness of religiously based societies. In the contemporary world, only Islam has offered a theocratic state as an alternative to liberalism. However Fukuyama confidently suggests that societies are satisfied in the sphere of personal life which is permitted in liberal societies. On the other hand, the vast majority of the world's nationalist movements do not have a political program, according to him. So he implies that religion and nationalism may not pose any challenge. (Fukuyama, 1992). Sadly in a post 9/11 world (attack on the World Trade Centre in New York) this is untrue. Religious fundamentalism/radicalism has constituted an ideology on its own that challenges liberal and socialist governments alike.

Fukuyama suggests that the international life for the part of the world which has history is more occupied with economics than with politics or strategy. The death of Marxist Leninism, means the growing of common marketization of international relations. The world at this point would be divided into historical and post historical states. Conflict between these states, would still be possible. Also ethnic and nationalist violence, terrorism will continue. So at this point he again confirms that, the end of history cannot be achieved throughout the world and also there will still be contradiction between different countries and new emerging challenges. On the other hand Francis Fukuyama states that the end of history will be very sad because struggle for recognition will be replaced with economic aims. There will be neither art nor philosophy. As a result of this, most of the people that have reached the end of history feel nostalgia and this may cause competition even in the post- historical world. So here he again confirms that, there will not be a phase in the world history which is totally peaceful and without any contradiction or challenges. (Fukuyama, 1992)

On East-West relations today, two points are salient from Fukuyama's thesis. The first is that liberal capitalism came out triumphant from the cold war and its principle has penetrated even the Great Walls of China. The second is that other ideologies like religious fundamentalism and nationalism influence that behavior of Eastern and Western states.

What is Ideology?

The first problem confronting any discussion of the nature of ideology is the fact that there is no settled or agreed definition of the term, only a collection of rival definitions. As David McLellan puts it, 'Ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of the social sciences.' (McLellan, 1995:7). Few political terms have been the subject of such deep and impassioned controversy. This has occurred for two reasons. In the first place, as all concepts of ideology acknowledge a link between theory and practice, the term uncovers highly contentious debates about the role of ideas in politics and the relationship between beliefs and theories on the one hand, and material life or political conduct on the other. Secondly, the concept of ideology has not been able to stand apart from the ongoing struggle between and amongst political ideologies. For much of its history, the term ideology has been used as a political weapon, a device which condemns or criticizes rival sets of ideas or belief systems. Not until the second half of the twentieth century was neutral and apparently objective concept of ideology widely employed, and even then disagreement persisted over the social role and political significance of ideology. Among the meanings that have been attached to ideology are the following:

- A political belief system.
- An action-oriented set of political ideas.
- The ideas of the ruling class.

- The world-view of a particular social class or social group
- Political ideas that embody or articulate class or social group
- Political ideas that embody or articulate class or social interests
- Ideas that propagate false consciousness amongst the exploited or oppressed.
- Ideas that situate the individual within a social context and generate a sense of collective belonging.
- An officially sanctioned set of ideas used to legitimize political system or regime.
- An all-embracing political doctrine that claims a monopoly of truth.
- An abstract and highly systematic set of political ideas. (yourarticlelibrary.com, 2019)

The origins of the term are nevertheless clear. The word ideology was coined during the French Revolution by Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), and was first used in public in 1796. For de Tracy, ideologie referred to a new 'science of ideas', literally an idea-ology. With a rationalist zeal typical of the enlightenment, he believed that it was possible objectively to uncover the origins of ideas, and proclaimed that this new science would come to enjoy the same status as established science such as biology and zoology. More boldly, since all forms of enquiry are based on ideas, de Tracy suggested that ideology would eventually come to be recognized as the queen of sciences. However, despite these high expectations, the original meaning of the term has had little impact on later usage.

Ideology is a set of ideas that seeks to explain some or all aspects of reality, lays down values and preferences in respect of both ends and means, and includes a programme of action for the attainment of the defined ends. Padelford and Lincoln believe “Ideology is a body of ideas concerning economic, social and political values and goals which posit action programmes for attaining these goals”. (yourarticlelibrary.com, 2019). Richard Snyder and Hubert Wilson defined it as “a cluster of ideas about life, society and government, which originates, in most cases, as consciously advocated dogmatically asserted social, political or religious slogans or battle-cries and which through continuous usage and preaching gradually become the characteristic beliefs or dogmas of a particular group, party, or nationality.” (yourarticlelibrary.com, 2019).

In the context of international politics, ideology does not mean only a general ideology involving a set of ideas and offering a particular definite view of the world. International Politics, as Karl Manneheim observes, “ideology refers to the particular ideologies which are used by nations for securing the goals of their national interests. These are in the form of simple, legal or ethical or biological principles such as justice, equality, fraternity or natural struggle in relations.” (yourarticlelibrary.com, 2019). These are in the form of conscious disguise for covering the real nature of political relations and policies. Words are twisted or construed narrowly. Situations are distorted and conclusions are drawn in such a way as may dupe others, e.g. deception, violation of moral codes, law and conventions. Karl Manneheim names these as 'Particular Ideologies', which are used by nations to criticize and reject the views of the opponents and to justify their own ideas and perceptions. Such ideologies are used as means for exercising power (yourarticlelibrary.com, 2019). Some examples of ideologies include, liberalism, conservatism, nationalism, socialism, fascism, ecologism, anarchism, feminism, religious fundamentalism, etc.

Ideology as an Element of State Behavior

States react to both their internal and external environment. This section explains how states from both the East and West respond to the rise of religious fundamentalism, particularly Islamic fundamentalism in a post-cold war era. The primary question to be answered in this section is how Islamic fundamentalism has affected relations between states like Russia, China and the US. The word “fundamentalism” is derived from the Latin word “fundamentum” which

means base. The term was first used in debates within American Protestantism in the early twentieth century. Religious fundamentalism is a religious-political movement or project. According to Heywood (2017), religious fundamentalism is caused by secularization, post colonialism, and globalization.

The basic themes of religious fundamentalism is impulse, anti-modernism and militancy. Fundamentalism is associated with all the world's major religions - Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism as well as Christianity. This section focuses on Islamic fundamentalism and the response from the East and the West. Islamic fundamentalism is an intense and militant faith in Islamic beliefs as the overriding principles of social life and politics, as well as of personal morality. Islamic fundamentalists wish to establish the primacy of religion over politics. In practice this means the founding of an Islamic state, a theocracy ruled by spiritual rather than temporal authority and applying Sharia, divine Islamic law, based upon principles expressed in Koran (Heywood, 2017). In a post - cold war era, countries like Russia, China and the US are contending with Islamic fundamentalist groups (terrorist groups) such as al - Qaeda, ISIS and the Talibans. The 9/11 attack orchestrated by Osama bin Laden marked a crescendo in the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism has constituted an element of state behavior from the East and the West.

Russia

Russia had contended with the Islamic Caucasus Emirate (ICE), ISIS and Hisb-ut Tahir. On October 31, 2015, a Russian charter flight to St. Petersburg from Egypt crashed 25 minutes after takeoff, killing all 224 passengers and crew members. ISIS's Egyptian affiliate, Wilayat Sinai (Sinai Province), claimed responsibility. The al-Qaeda linked Chenchen rebel leader, Doku Umarov coordinated several domestic terrorist attacks. This includes the November, 2009 bombing of a commuter train between Moscow and St. Petersburg, the March 2010 suicide bombing in the Moscow subway, and the January 2011 Moscow airport bombings. (counterterrorism.com, 2019). In September 2015, Russia began a bombing campaign in Syria after a request from the Assad regime in Damascus. The U.S. government condemned Russia for acting independently of the international anti-ISIS coalition. The following month, Chenchen leader Ramzankadyrov called upon Russian President Vladimir Putin to send Chenchen ground troops to Syria to defeat ISIS. Moscow has described its intervention as an effort to degrade ISIS forces and reduce the threat of terrorism. (counterterrorism.com, 2019).

In June 2019, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres appointed Russian diplomat Vladimir Ivanovich Voronkov to lead the newly created U.N. Counter-Terrorism Office. Russia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Russia also belongs to the FATF-style regional organizations in the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) and the Council of Europe's Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism. Russia is a primary funding source for the EAG and provides technical assistance and other resources to enhance legislative and regulatory frameworks. In 2015, the Russian government reportedly investigated more than 3,500 individuals suspected of involvement in international terrorist organization. The Russian government froze more than 3,000 accounts of approximately \$610,000. (counterterrosim.com, 2019).

US

The U.S. is the main target of most Islamic fundamentalist groups. The US has championed the war on terror through its campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria on al-Qaeda and ISIS respectively. However, the US reaction to Islamic fundamentalism varies depending on the region. It can be verified that U.S. policy and its public expression become “more nuanced and situationally specific with increasing distance from the Persian Gulf” (Davidson, 1998). This fact

is evident when exploring U.S. interaction with Algeria, Tunisia, and Palestine.

The U.S. treats Algeria with contradictory measures by reprimanding violence against radical groups, yet taking no concrete action to achieve this. In November 1994, Assistant Secretary of State Pelletreau asserted that a solution to Algeria's political crisis "lies not in a strategy of repression, but one of inclusion and reconciliation," and expressed concern over "the growing influence of hardliners in the military leadership who reject compromise with the opposition and intend to step up efforts to crush the armed insurgency by force." He claims that the U.S. government has "repeatedly stressed to Algerian leaders at the highest levels, the need for concrete steps to establish dialogue with opposition elements - secular and Islamist - willing to work towards a non-violent solution." (Gullapalli, 2004:58). While the U.S. is quick to publicly advocate such a position in favor of peaceful compromise between the Algeria and radical opposition, it refrains from any concrete action against Algeria in terms of sanctions or proposals to the United Nations or International Monetary Fund. (Gullapalli, 2004).

The U.S. is more concerned with the ends of repressing extremist power in Algeria than it is with prohibiting the violent means of such repression. A similar position was taken in January 1992 when the U.S. did not interfere as the Algerian military cancelled elections that would have most probably given power to the radical Islamic Salvation Front. Former secretary of state James Baker recently acknowledged that "[w]hen I was at the state department, we pursued a policy of excluding the radical fundamentalists in Algeria, even though we recognized that this was somewhat at odds with our support of democracy." (Gullapalli, 2004: 58). These events with Algeria illustrate the primary American objective of maintaining the political stability of governments that cooperate with the U.S., even if such efforts clash with other American ideology. (Gullapalli, 2004).

The former U.S. policy toward Algeria is similar to the later implemented in its neighbor Tunisia. Here the regime of Zayna al-'Abidin Ben'Ali had successfully suppressed all Islamist and secular forms of political opposition at the expense of intense violence and human rights violations. While such unlawful methods of establishing stability would regularly warrant U.S. reprimand or interference, Tunisia actually received praise for its participation in the Arab-Israeli "peace process" and its "GDP growth in excess of 5 percent per year for the past five years," with only the faintest plea for "a corresponding openness in the political system together with greater emphasis on human rights" (Gullapalli, 2004). Once again, according to U.S. interests, the end justifies the means in distant political arenas.

American policy regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict represents an entirely different ideology that becomes far more complex due to the numerous opposing factors that must be resolved. While the U.S. promotes a line of pacifism and inclusion in Algeria and Tunisia, it has openly supported an Israeli policy of eradication concerning Palestine. Yet the U.S. has been careful to avoid acknowledging the Israeli government's support of Palestinian Islamist forces as a counterbalance to the secularist Palestine Liberation Organization. Rather, Washington has not restrained, even rhetorically, Israel's subsequent efforts to wipe out those same Islamist forces. The label of terrorist, once reserved for the PLO, is now deployed against Hamas and Hizb Allah, even when they target not civilians but troops and armored patrols. (Lee, 1997).

Rhetorical strategies utilizing the threat of "Islamic fundamentalism" and "terrorism" have been a major feature of U.S. policy in Israel. Such methods allow America to remain removed from the conflict yet, still assert strong positions in support of Israel by condemning these inaccurately labeled groups. (Gullapalli, 2004). While Israel and its U.S. supporters have explicitly promoted the view that Islamic fundamentalism is a major adversary of the U.S., this mutually self-serving and self-reinforcing exercise in threat construction finds many influential proponents in U.S. policy circles as well. The February 1993 Joint Chiefs of Staff report on *Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the US*, for instance, observes that in the Middle

East and Southwest Asia radical political Islam and a politically and militarily resurgent Iran threaten regional stability and directly challenge a number of US interests, including access of Gulf oil, political reform, democratic development and settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The domestic basis of this ideology is the American desire to preserve the institutions, privileges, and circuits of military capital present during the Cold War era. (Gullapalli, 2004)

Political Islam thus serves as the new “evil empire” for the powerful conservative U.S. interests urging high military spending. Also, Islamic fundamentalism resonates with pervasive negative attitudes of the American public formed by historic rivalry, domestic discomfort, xenophobia, and terrorism. Ultimately, by promoting the Islamist threat, the U.S. justifies its growing military presence in the Persian Gulf and other crucial Muslim regions. (Stork, 1997)

China

As the leading communist state, China has set up domestic strategies to limit the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. One of each strategy is the use of Xinjiang re-education camp for muslims. A UN committee said it received reports that the camp that is overtly referred to as vocational training centers are holding up to a million ethnic minority Uyghurs and other muslims; subjecting them to force political indoctrination. (amp.scmp.com, 2018)

Ideology as a Tool of Foreign Policy

This section looks at the how ideology guides the relation between Eastern and Western states. The focus is on Russia-US relations and China-US relations. This represents East capitalist-West capitalist relations and East communist and West capitalist relations respectively.

Russia – US Relations

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked a new crossroads of international relations and the start of a new era. According to Glazunova (2017), despite the end of the cold war, ideologies have come back to play a role in Russia -US relations. The present confrontation is between liberal ideas of a universal world conservative anti-globalistic tendencies. European and American media have often criticized Putin's Russia as revisionist, aggressive, nationalistic and authoritarian. (Glazunova, 2017). The new phase of ideology in Russia was captured by a Senior Associate and Chair of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, A. Kolesnikov in his article *Russia ideology after Crimea*. He opined thus:

Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Russia public has embraced an increasingly conservative and nationalistic ideology... The new ideology is based on a deliberate recycling of archaic forms of mass consciousness, a phenomenon that can be termed the sanctification of “unfreedom”. Confined to a besieged fortress, surrounded by external enemies, and faced with a domestic fifth column, the people of Russia have begun to experience Stockholm syndrome and have thrown their support behind the command of the fortress, President Vladimir Putin... This sacralization of unfreedom gives birth to militarism. (Glazunova, 2017:59)

Communism has died out and conservatism has become the dominant ideology in Russia today. In 2016, among registered political parties about 20 directly declared conservative values and principles. At least another 15, according to the program and rhetoric, can be named “near-conservative”. Two of the four parties represented in the Duma openly declare their adherence to conservatism (United Russia) and nationalism (the Liberal – Democratic Party). A third party in the Duma – the Communist Party of Russian Federation – also appeals to historical traditions and cultural roots (Glazunova, 2017).

However, conservatism only came with the Putin era. The first decade of post – cold war era witnessed a level of “de-ideologization and westernization” of Russia. As a former Russian foreign Minister stated, “our choice is ... to progress according to generally accepted rules. They were invented by the West, and I'm a Westernizer in this respect - the West is rich and we need to be friends with it ...” (Kozyrev cited in Glazunova, 2017:60). This explained America's favorable relations with Russia in the 1990s. President Boris Yeltsin was a guarantor of liberal and democratic reforms in Russia, and of not returning to some kind of totalitarian regime that could jeopardize US interests. Russia at the time was going through structural adjustment under the auspice of the U.S. The first half of the decade, Russia was obedient, accepting the status of America's junior partner (Glazunova, 2017). By the middle of the 1990s, the Russian people were dissatisfied with Yeltsin's policies and saw it as a betrayal of national interest. However as a result of American covert support, Yeltsin was able to win his re-election campaign. The US was able to help Russia secure a \$10.2 billion loan from IMF. These huge sums not only allowed Yeltsin's team to pay off long – owed wages and pensions but also allowed him to deploy a massive “black arts” campaign against his opponent. Yeltsin's victory did not alter public perception/opinion as there were growing criticisms of Russian foreign policy from 1996 -1999 (Glazunova, 2017).

In March of 1999, Russia's new Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was on his way to Washington D.C. to negotiate with Vice President Albert Gore the next trache of IMF monetary aid. After being informed about the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia which was to commence a few hours later, Primakov ordered the plane to return to Russia. This was known as the “Primakov's loop”. The Primakov loop marked a turning point from westernization/de-ideologization to conservatism/nationalism (Glazunova, 2017). Conservatism refers to moderate or cautious behavior, or a fear of or refusal to change (Heywood, 2017).

Putin's Russia was unsatisfied with the liberal policies of the Democratic Party and was convinced that it was easier to have common grounds with Republicans. Russia considered Republicans less dogmatic and more maneuverable. The Republicans are closer to real politik concept which related to Russian conservatism. The Reagan and George H.W. Bush administration took a cautious approach to US policies towards Russia but when the Democrats entered the White House, they came with policies of liberal-democratic crusades and reformist activism. After 9/11 attack on the US, President George W. Bush in 2005 stressed that in order to protect the American people and defeat terrorism, America had to spread its values to other countries. The Bush Freedom Agenda was a rebirth of liberal internationalism. Moscow saw this agenda as a justification for American interference in the internal affairs of other states. Thus, Russia firmly advocated non interference (Glazunova, 2017).

In 2003, and again in 2005, Washington supported “color revolutions” in the Russian “backyard”. Ukraine was the most sensitive for Russians. Angela Stent identified the magnitude of support for the “Orange Revolution” by referencing the fact that Ukraine had become the third largest recipient of US aid after only Israel and Egypt. This approach inflamed US - Russian relations. The result of this ideological confrontation was Putin's legendary Munich Security Conference speech of 2007. The Munich speech marked a new phase in Russia's relations with the United States and the world, which is continuing until the present (Glazunova, 2017). The basic construct of Putin's Munich speech was the idea of “sovereign democracy,” which refers to a “form of political life where political power, the authority from which power is derived, and decisions are taken by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose of gaining material welfare, freedom and fairness for all citizens, social groups and nationalities and for the people that formed it” (Surkov cited in Glazunova, 2017:62). Of course, the key word of the construction was “sovereign,” not “democracy.”

There were several core ideas in speech: neither the United States (nor any other nation) can teach Russia about democracy; Russia would no longer accept an agenda dictated in Washington; and Russia's political system meets the needs and expectations of the Russian

people. The concept was more than just an ideological response to Bush's Freedom Agenda: it challenged the University of the Western Value System and proved that Russia's ideology and policy choices are derived from its own unique history and are as legitimate as those of the United States or Europe. Strong “conservative/preservative” evocative appeals to ideological and political traditions became dominant in Russian domestic and foreign policy theoretical discourse and practice.

US – China Relations

Since the end of the Second World War, the US has been the champion of liberal democratic values and ideals. The US is also a strong proponent of capitalism's market oriented and laissez faire principles. On the other hand, China is touted as the champion of Marxism/Communism following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Xuetong (2018) suggests that there are three political values competing with each other in China. These are Marxism, economic pragmatism and Chinese traditional values. The government tries to combine these three values.

Marxism is the official ideology of China. Marxism guides all areas of work and administration. However, china does not project Marxism in its foreign policy statements. The principles of “opening up” and “peaceful development” make it impossible to project Marxist ideals in foreign policy. Adopting a Marxist principle like class struggle will give China an aggressive international image.

Economic pragmatism came with the 1978 reform policies of Deng Xiaoping. This reform proposed economic prosperity as the best judge of the success of China's ideology. China still abides by the Marxist principle that the economy is the basis of comprehensive national strength. Therefore China elevates economic interests to the level of main policy objective.

Traditionalism is not Confucianism but combines all ancient Chinese thoughts. It emphasizes the significance of political leadership, as well as the role of strategic credibility. It also emphasizes leading by example. This is why it is important for China to present demonstrable achievements (Xuetong, 2018).

China is on the road to becoming a super power. China is today regarded as a land of opportunity and rising economic might (Xuetong, 2018). According to Christian Reus-Smit, 'a fear that power shifts to the East, non - Western great power will seek to reshape international order according to their own values and practices'. (Reus-Smit, 2017: 881). Former Australian Prime Minister Kelvin Rudd recently remarked, 'very soon we will find ourselves at a point in history when, for the first time since George III, a non -Western, non -democratic state will be the largest economy in the world' (Rudd cited in Xuetong, 2018: 6). China's rise in power is a threat to US international hegemony. The Texas A&M university professor, Christopher Layne suggests that the US has the options of engaging or containing China's rise to super power status. Engagement in this sense implies increasing China's contact with American values and increasing economic relations. As China increasingly gets tied into the international economy, its interdependence will limit it from taking actions that will affect its access to foreign markets, capital and high-technology from the US. On the other hand, containment relies on using traditional “hard power” tools of military might and alliance diplomacy to thwart China's great power emergence (Layne, 2008).

In reality, Washington combines elements of engagement and containment in dealing with China. In 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States promises that America will act to prevent any state from building up military capabilities in the hope of surpassing or equaling the power of the US. Ideologically, this strategy promotes American ideas. It is based on a distinct

American internationalism that reflects the union of US values and national interests. (Layne, 2008)

Some writers and analysts have opined that there is no ideological rift between the US and China. The State Department of Policy and Planning, Kiron Skinner, stated that the competition between the US and China is not an ideological one. She supports this by claiming that China does not have a coherent and universal ideology (washingtonpost.com, 2019). However, the US still criticizes China over issues such as human rights, democratization and religious freedom. From a Chinese perspective, the US believes that any non-democratic system should adopt the values of democracy and freedom as defined by the US (Feng et al, 2017). China and the United States address political issues differently due to their different philosophical traditions. The United States prefers to 'do unto others what one wants to do,' while China abides by the Golden Rule of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you". To paraphrase what Deng Xiaoping said in late 1989, China has never done anything to harm the United States, and China does not want the United States to do anything to harm China either. China's domestic political practices have never been intended to undermine American interests. In fact, China has been very responsive to the United States' major concerns, such as some human rights cases and the discussion on the recently enacted 2016 PRC Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations' Activities with Mainland China. A country's political system should be chosen by its own people and China has never and will never interfere in the United States' internal affairs (Feng et al, 2017).

In June 2013, when President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama met at the Sunnylands estate, they reached a consensus on jointly building a "new model of major power relations." This concept has three core principles: no conflict or confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation. Among them, the principle of mutual respect means respecting each other's political system and development path instead of imposing one's own will and public policies on the other. The national political system dictated by the Chinese Constitution and the preservation of social stability are among China's core interests. These are important preconditions that lay the foundation for U.S. – China relations to remain sound and pursue a stable development (Feng et al, 2017). Over the past several decades, development in US-China bilateral relations, China and the United States have managed to work together on a number of issues despite fundamental political and ideological differences. China and the United States have broadened and deepened cooperation on bilateral, regional, and global issues in which they share common interests since achieving a breakthrough in diplomatic relations in 1979. Focusing on these common interests and working together are conducive to warding off political interference and ensuring the stable evolution of bilateral ties (Feng et al, 2017).

However, the Cold War has long passed, but the United States' mentality during that period has persisted. Political factors have been at play in the China-US relationship both visibly and invisibly, and directly and indirectly. Within this context, China has made consistent efforts not to interfere and focus on common interests. The United States, on the other hand, has been playing a double game: while it never let go of the political issues posed by ideological differences that have led to a difference in political regimes, it has also cooperated with China in the pursuit of mutual benefits. It is important to remember that political and ideological differences have never outweighed pragmatic cooperation and collaboration over the past several decades, and today those differences remain manageable for both sides (Feng et al, 2017).

Conclusion

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin wall, the ideological contest that characterized the cold war era has receded. There is no strong ideological conflict today that can be equaled to that witnessed between 1947 and 1990. This does not mean a death of ideologies. This work looked at the role of ideology in East - West relations in a post-cold war era.

The focus was on how Islamic fundamentalism affects East-West relations and the role of

ideology in Russia -US relations and US - China relations. Francis Fukuyama's end of history thesis explained how ideological contest has ended and liberalism emerged the winner. He stated that history ends with liberalism as the last stage of historical evolution. He also states that religion may prove a challenge but will not be able to withstand liberalism. However, from the findings of this work, religious fundamentalism has become one of the key challenges facing the East and West. US, China and Russia have had to tackle Islamic fundamentalism cooperatively or individually.

Russia has shunned communism and focused more on conservatism/nationalism. Russia opposes US interference in its internal affairs. Russia believes that the liberal internationalist agenda of the US is a form of interference and negates Russia's interest. However, China-US relations is primarily defined by national interest and not ideology. These interests are mainly political and economic and have little to do with ideology. Finally, it should be noted emphatically that ideology does play a role in East-West relations but does not define East-West relations as it did in the cold war era. Ideological conflict is not dead but merely comatose.

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